
Why are there no tariffs on Russia? Critics often question President Trump’s approach, accusing him of being a Russian agent due to his focus on tariffs against allies like Canada and Europe, while seemingly sparing Russia. However, these critics overlook the significant punitive measures Trump has already enforced.
During his first term, Trump imposed over 270 sanctions on Russian entities and individuals. These measures, combined with actions taken in the Biden administration, reduced U.S. imports from Russia to a mere $3 billion in 2024, down from $29 billion in 2021. Russia’s role in U.S. trade is now negligible.
Trump ranks third in total sanctions on Russia, following Presidents Obama and Biden. Examining the broader picture, Obama’s sanctions came after Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. Despite this, no one accused Obama of being a Russian asset. Similarly, Biden’s sanctions followed Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, yet he failed to achieve a negotiated settlement.
In stark contrast, Trump provided President Zelensky with two clear paths for continued U.S. support, emphasizing defense in exchange for resources like minerals and energy. Although Zelensky declined these offers, labeling Trump a Russian agent ignores the reality of his efforts to end the conflict—more than his predecessors.
Moreover, U.S. exports to Russia dropped to $526 million in 2024, creating a modest trade deficit of $2.5 billion. This is minor compared to the deficits with Canada ($63 billion) and the European Union ($236 billion), showcasing Russia’s limited impact on U.S. trade imbalances.
Trump’s sanctions have been extensive. In 2018, the Treasury Department froze the U.S. assets of 7 oligarchs, 12 companies, and 17 senior Putin allies to counter election meddling and cyberattacks. The 2017 CAATSA law, signed under congressional pressure, ensured sanctions on 39 Russian defense and intelligence entities. Trump’s administration addressed Ukraine-related aggression and other provocations with 273 sanctions.
Further, Trump banned Kaspersky Labs software from U.S. government systems in 2017 due to spying risks, and in 2019, sanctioned firms building the Nord Stream 2 pipeline to limit Russia’s energy influence in Europe. In 2025, he continued with oil and banking sanctions. Combined with Biden’s 2022 energy import ban, these measures reduced imports from $29 billion in 2021 to just $3 billion in 2024, making tariffs unnecessary.
Meanwhile, Europe and Canada play a significant role in the U.S. trade deficit. In 2024, the goods trade deficit with the European Union hit $235.6 billion, and Canada’s reached $63.3 billion. These nations impose higher tariffs on U.S. imports, skewing trade balances in their favor. For instance, Germany restricts U.S. agricultural exports through strict EU rules and imposes a 10% tariff on U.S. cars, while the EU averages 3.5% tariffs on U.S. goods. Canada levies tariffs up to 270% on U.S. dairy and limits U.S. lumber with duties and quotas.
The U.S. has shouldered Europe’s defense burden since WWII, contributing about 70% of NATO’s total spending. This allowed EU nations and Canada to invest in other sectors while enjoying trade surpluses with the U.S. Germany spends 1.6% of GDP on defense versus the U.S.’s 3.5%, and Canada hovers at 1.4%.
Unlike Europe and Canada, Russia faced U.S. sanctions, not subsidies. Democrats label Trump a Russian agent for reducing Ukraine and Europe’s defense funding, but his motives argue otherwise. Trump’s reluctance to fund these efforts aims to prevent European nations from escalating tensions with Russia.
Britain and France consider deploying troops to Ukraine under a ‘coalition of the willing,’ a move that could involve the U.S. in a direct clash with Russia, risking a third world war. Trump believes Europe would be less likely to take such risks without U.S. support.
Ultimately, Trump is weary of Europe enjoying trade surpluses while relying on American defense and courting global disaster. The EU’s $235.6 billion and Canada’s $63.3 billion trade surpluses with the U.S. in 2024 underline this imbalance.